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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal sampling and pricing of paid content for pub-
lishers of news websites. Publishers offer free content samples both to dis-
close journalistic quality to consumers and to generate online advertising
revenues. We examine sampling where the publisher sets the number of
free sample articles and consumers select the articles of their choice. Con-
sumers learn from the free samples in a Bayesian fashion and base their
subscription decisions on posterior quality expectations. We show that
sampling enhances subscription demand only if consumers have low qual-
ity expectations in relation to actual quality. Taking advertising and sub-
scription revenues into account, we find that the publisher should employ
either a paid-only or a free content strategy when consumers have high
quality expectations. When consumers have low quality expectations, em-
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1 Introduction
Sampling paid content is a business model where publishers offer some of their
content for free and charge readers to access content behind the “paywall.” For
instance, the New York Times offers access to 20 articles for free on its website
each month and asks visitors to become digital subscribers if they would like to
read more (New York Times, 2011).1 The Daily, a subscription based digital news
publication created for Apple’s iPad, offers 14 issues for free.2 Likewise, both the
Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal have a paywall on their website giving
access to limited free content. Offering samples of paid content allows publish-
ers to generate revenues from online advertising in addition to revenues from
digital subscriptions. Sampling paid content as a business model has recently
become popular in the news industry after steep cutbacks in online advertising.
However, to our knowledge, the implications of this business model for digi-
tal content providers have not been formally addressed. This paper addresses
this issue and studies profit-maximizing sampling and pricing in online news
industries. Specifically, we study the two interrelated questions of how many
articles the publisher should offer for free and how much the publisher should
charge for the content behind the paywall.
Sampling paid content currently has seen a renaissance in the news indus-
try. The New York Times had offered TimesSelect, an online subscription program
giving access to the work of columnists and to the newspaper’s archives, from
2005 to 2007 (New York Times, 2007). The publisher decided to abandon its digi-
tal subscription program because the projections for growth from subscriptions
were low compared to the growth from online advertising. For a similar reason
CNN’s subscription-based breaking news service CNN Pipeline was replaced by
a free advertising-supported service in June 2007, only a year and a half after its
introduction.3
Although publishers have several reasons to introduce digital subscription
programs with paywalls, three are of particular relevance. First, paywalls allow
publishers to generate revenues from digital subscriptions which are necessary
to sustain quality journalism. Purely advertising based business models did
not generate enough revenues for publishers to cover expensive forms of news-
gathering such as international coverage and investigative reporting (Abram-
son 2011). Arthur Sulzberger, Publisher of the New York Times, explained in a
letter to the readers reasons why The Times introduced digital subscriptions in
1Visitors are offered one of three subscription plans: $15 a month for unlimited visits online
and access to The Times’s various apps for smartphones; $20 a month for The Times online and
its app on Apple’s iPad; and for $35 a month, an “All Digital Access” package.
2See http://www.thedaily.com.
3See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CNN Pipeline.
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the end of March 2011: “It will allow us to develop new sources of revenue and
to strengthen our ability to continue our journalistic mission as well as to un-
dertake digital innovations that will enable us to provide you with high-quality
journalism” (New York Times, 2011). Second, offering free sample articles allows
publishers to generate online advertising revenues from online visitors. Ac-
cording to comScore, between a third and a half of all traffic to five major U.S.
newspaper sites comes from search engines (CBS Interactive Business Network,
2010). The study emphasizes the reliance that the big newspapers have on Ya-
hoo, Google and Microsoft to drive their online revenue models. Third, offering
free sample articles allows publishers to disclose the “journalistic quality” of
their news website to online visitors. This information transmission to poten-
tial subscribers affects their willingness to pay and may enhance the demand
for digital subscriptions. The use of free samples as advertisements for the con-
tent behind the paywall can be viewed as a form of “the old marketing tactic
offering free samples of consumer products, but updated for the digital age”
(Shapiro and Varian 1998, p. 86).
Our paper seeks to shed light on the business model of sampling paid con-
tent taking the aforementioned three reasons into account. In particular, we
are interested in characterizing the profit-maximizing sampling and pricing de-
cisions of publishers employing digital subscription programs with paywalls
when consumers are uncertain about journalistic quality. In doing so, we de-
velop a model for news websites with the following main features:
• Paid Content: Publishers sell digital subscriptions and generate revenues
from subscription fees as well as from advertisements included in the paid
content.
• Free Content: Publishers offer free sample articles and thereby generate
revenues from advertisements shown to online visitors.
• Quality Disclosure: Publishers also offer free content samples to disclose
the journalistic quality of their product offering to online visitors which
can induce paid digital subscriptions.
Besides these main features, our model assumes consumers update their
prior beliefs about quality in a Bayesian fashion taking the observed sample
qualities into account. The updating of prior beliefs is not only relevant for
recently launched news publications such as The Daily, but also for well-estab-
lished news publications such as the New York Times. Even if the prior for The
Times is less “diffuse,” sampling nonetheless reduces uncertainty about qual-
ity. The posterior quality expectations then determine consumers’ willingness
to pay and hence their subscription decisions.
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On the supply side, we consider a publisher operating in a two-sided mar-
ket environment who receives revenues from both subscriptions and advertise-
ments. Taking the consumers’ quality updating into account, the publisher faces
a fundamental tradeoff between an expansion effect (through learning) and a
cannibalization effect (through free offerings) on subscription demand induced
by sampling. In our setting, the publisher can choose among three possible
strategies: a “sampling strategy,” a “paid-only strategy,” and a “free content
strategy.”
Distinctive of our approach to modeling sampling is that the publisher sets
the number of free sample articles and consumers select the articles of their
choice. This type of sampling is used, for example, by the New York Times and
Audible.com, a distributor of digital audiobooks.4 An alternative approach to
sampling is where the firm chooses not only the number of free sample articles
but also the sample content itself. This of course allows the firm to strategically
manipulate the sample and creates an environment where customers are likely
to discount the sample quality in estimating actual quality. We leave this type
to future research.
We derive the following three key results. First, we derive subscription de-
mand based on consumers’ posterior expectations about content quality and
distinguish between the cases of high and low quality expectations in relation to
actual quality. We show that offering free samples is always demand-reducing
when consumers have high quality expectations. The reason is that sampling
reduces quality expectations and thus has only a cannibalization effect and no
expansion effect on demand. When consumers have low quality expectations,
sampling has both a cannibalization and an expansion effect, and hence sam-
pling may be demand-enhancing. Compared to high quality expectations, sam-
pling may increase quality expectations, and hence subscription demand. We
show that sampling is demand-enhancing when the cannibalization effect is
small compared to the expansion effect.
Second, we examine how the publisher’s optimal sampling and pricing de-
cisions are related. We show that the subscription price and the number of
free samples are negatively related when consumers have high quality expecta-
tions. This is a consequence of the reduction in consumers’ willingness to pay
that stems from lower posterior expectations. When consumers have low qual-
ity expectations, there is a negative relation between the subscription price and
the number of free samples if sampling is demand-reducing and a positive re-
lation if sampling is demand-enhancing. When sampling is demand-reducing,
4Classic examples of this type of sampling include many “clubs” such as Columbia House by
the Columbia Records division of CBS where, as an inducement to join, individuals are offered
a number of free records.
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the publisher can mitigate the negative effect on profits from a lower subscrip-
tion demand by charging a lower price. However, when sampling is demand-
enhancing, it is optimal for the publisher to set a higher subscription price.
Third, we derive how the publisher’s optimal strategy is linked to consumers’
prior expectations. When consumers have high quality expectations, we show
that the publisher should never employ a sampling strategy. Whether the pub-
lisher employs a paid-only strategy or a free content strategy depends on the ad-
vertising revenues. We find that the firm should employ a free content strategy
when online advertising revenues from the samples are high and a paid-only
strategy when online advertising revenues from the samples are low. When
consumers have low quality expectations, employing a sampling strategy may
be optimal for the publisher. We illustrate this by analyzing profit-maximizing
pricing and sampling decisions and find that the publisher should offer more
articles for free when consumers have lower quality expectations and when on-
line advertising revenues are higher.
Our paper is related to two literature streams. The first is the literature on
two-sided markets. Several studies focus on business models for media firms
operating in two-sided markets, and in particular, on how competition influ-
ences the choice of content financing.5 For instance, Kind et al. (2009) analyze
how competition, captured by the number of media platforms and content dif-
ferentiation between platforms, affects the decision of whether to raise revenues
from advertisers or consumer payments. Godes et al. (2009) investigate a sim-
ilar question, but focus on competition between platforms in different media
industries. However, the literature on two-sided markets has not addressed the
profit impact from providing free content samples on publishers. The paper by
Xiang and Soberman (2011) makes a step in this direction and analyzes preview
provision for media firms through the front page. To the best of our knowledge,
optimal content sampling—especially its impact on revenues from subscription
and online advertising—has not been addressed.
Second, this paper is related to the broad literature on consumer learning
about product attributes. Firms enable consumer learning through disclosing
information about their products and services. Information can be disclosed in
various ways; for instance, through informative advertising (see Anderson and
Renault 2006, and Bagwell 2007 for a comprehensive survey). Sun (2011) and
Hotz and Xiao (forthcoming) consider information disclosure through product
descriptions or third-party reviews. Another commonly used way for firms to
disclose information is through sampling. The distinctive feature of product
5Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006) focus on the case of television. See, for instance, Rochet
and Tirole (2004), Armstrong (2006), and Rysman (2009) for a broader perspective on two-sided
markets.
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samples is that they allow consumers to have an actual experience with the
good before purchase.6 Heiman et al. (2001) and Bawa and Shoemaker (2004)
study how sample promotions affect demand and the evolution ofmarket shares
for consumer goods. While sample promotions for consumer goods are “ex-
pensive,” Boom (2009) and Wang and Zhang (2009) argue that sampling in-
formation goods is essentially “for free.” However, when firms sample infor-
mation goods, they can only offer a portion of the good for free to avoid the
“information paradox” (Akerlof, 1970).7 The consumers’ inference from this
portion about the product’s attributes is most naturally modeled in a Bayesian
framework. Bayesian learning processes based on product experience have
been widely employed in the marketing literature, for instance, by Erdem and
Keane (1996), Ackerberg (2003), and Erdem et al. (2008).
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 derives consumer demand and introduces the strategies avail-
able to the publisher. Section 4 presents the analysis of optimal behavior and
Section 5 illustrates the publisher’s optimal strategy. Conclusions and direc-
tions for future research are offered in Section 6. To facilitate the exposition, all
proofs have been relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
This section introduces the model. We begin with the publisher, then move on
to consumers, and finally consider the sequencing of the decisions.
2.1 Publisher
A publisher produces N articles (N ∈ IN) and offers them through a news web-
site to potential readers. Producing the content involves fixed costs F ≥ 0.8 The
marginal costs of producing content are typically negligible and are therefore
set to zero. Article quality summarizes various quality attributes and may be
interpreted as “journalistic quality.” We assume that article qualities are uni-
formly distributed on the quality spectrum [0, V¯ ], which extends from the low-
6In most cases, consumers experience the product only after purchase. See Villas-Boas (2004)
and Kopalle and Lehmann (2006) for the case where consumers’ first-period experience influ-
ences their second-period choice.
7Samples of information goods typically come in the form of demo or light versions (soft-
ware), abstracts (academic publishing), previews (books and movies), or simply “samples”
(music). For an analysis of software sampling see, for instance, Fauge`re and Tayi (2007) and
Cheng and Tang (2010).
8We assume that the fixed cost do not exceed the (equilibrium) profit. Hence they do not
change the analysis and can therefore be omitted.
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est quality (normalized to zero) to the highest quality (V¯ > 0). The publisher
has private information about V¯ and allows consumers to download a free con-
tent sample at zero cost. Specifically, the publisher allows consumers to choose
n articles (n ∈ IN0) with qualities V1, . . . , Vn to download for free (for a promi-
nent example of this practice, see www.nytimes.com). In such an environment,
the publisher has no control over which articles the consumers read for free.
Besides subscription revenues, the publisher also receives advertising rev-
enues from selling online advertising space to advertisers. We assume that
there are two sources of advertising revenues: from offering free content and
from selling paid content. Specifically, the publisher generates advertising rev-
enue af (the price per impression) from each free sample article and average
advertising revenues ap from each digital subscriber.9 We assume that the av-
erage advertising revenues reflect the ongoing competitive market prices for ad
impressions and hence that both af and ap are exogenous to the publisher. Since
we are not interested in the advertising market per se, but only on its impact on
sampling, it is reasonable to assume that the demand for advertising is perfectly
elastic (Spence and Owen, 1977).
The publisher’s decision variables are the subscription price p and the num-
ber of articles n offered to consumers for free. The publisher can adopt one of
the following three strategies: a “sampling strategy,” a “paid-only strategy,” or
a “free content strategy.” In a sampling strategy 0 < n < N and p > 0, in a
paid-only strategy n = N and p > 0, and in a free content strategy n = 0 and
subscription is not an option.
2.2 Consumers
We consider a market with a unit measure of consumers who are uncertain
about the journalistic quality of the content. Specifically, consumer uncertainty
is due to not knowing the upper bound of the publisher’s quality spectrum
V¯ .10 Consumers have a common prior belief about V¯ which they update in
a Bayesian fashion. The consumers’ prior belief may stem, for instance, from
reviews, ratings or “word of mouth.” The natural conjugate family for a rep-
resentative (random) sample from a uniform distribution with unknown upper
bound is the Pareto distribution (DeGroot, 1970). Thus we capture the uncer-
tainty about V¯ by a prior belief v¯prior that follows a Pareto distribution with
parameters v¯0 > 0 and α > 1.11 In contrast to V¯ , the parameters of the prior
9Implicit in our formulation of per-subscriber advertising revenues ap is that readers’ eye-
balls are limited to a certain number of impressions.
10Note that the upper bound V¯ is monotonically related to the mean, which may be more
intuitive for consumers to think about.
11The restriction α > 1 ensures that the expectation of the prior distribution exists.
7
belief are common knowledge.12 The (Pareto) probability density function of
v¯prior is given by
f(v¯|v¯0, α) =
{
αv¯α0 /v¯
α+1 for v¯ > v¯0
0 otherwise,
and illustrated in Figure 1. Intuitively, consumers have a prior belief about
the lower bound of the highest quality V¯ (captured by v¯0) and the dispersion
of bounds above this level (captured by the shape parameter α). Given the
consumers’ prior knowledge about v¯0 and α, their prior expectation about V¯ is
E[V¯ |v¯0, α] = αv¯0
α− 1 . (1)
The prior belief about V¯ is updated taking the observed qualities of the free
samples into account. Specifically, consumers evaluate the n sample qualities
Vi = vi (i = 1, . . . , n) to form the posterior belief v˜post(n) about V¯ . Using standard
Bayesian analysis, v˜post(n) follows a Pareto distribution with minimal possible
value v˜0(n) = max{v¯0, v1, . . . , vn} and shape parameter α + n.13 The posterior
expectation of V¯ is given by
E[V¯ |v˜0(n), α] = (α + n)v˜0(n)
α + n− 1 . (2)
Consumers infer expected content quality E[V |v1, . . . , vn] from posterior beliefs
and knowing that qualities V are uniformly distributed on the quality spectrum
offered. We therefore have that
E[V |v1, . . . , vn] = E[V¯ |v˜0(n), α]
2
. (3)
We assume that consumers are heterogenous in their valuations for qual-
ity.14 The heterogeneity is captured by θ which is uniformly distributed on the
interval [0,1]. We further assume that consumers have unit demand for the paid
content and thus have two options. Each consumer can either subscribe to the
news website and buy the N articles at price p or access only the n free articles.
A consumer’s indirect utility V˜ (p, y;n) from these two options is given by
V˜ (p, y;n) =
{
NθE[V |v1, . . . , vn] + y − p if she subscribes at price p
nθE[V |v1, . . . , vn] + y if she stays with the free articles,
12For instance, the publisher can learn about prior beliefs employing standard market re-
search techniques such as surveys.
13The proof of this result is reproduced in the Appendix.
14This assumption is borrowed from the literature on vertical product differentiation (see, for
instance, Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982).
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where y denotes (real) income. This specification assumes that readers are neu-
tral about ads, that is, they neither find advertisements a nuisance nor do they
appreciate them.15 In effect, this means they can skip over them (or mechani-
cally screen them out) at essentially zero cost.
2.3 Timing
The publisher first decides on both its digital subscription price p and the num-
ber of free sample articles n. Next, consumers observe a realization of sample
qualities V1 = v1, . . . , Vn = vn and update their beliefs about the highest qual-
ity V¯ . Finally, consumers decide whether to subscribe or to stay with the free
samples.
3 Consumer Demand
In this section, we derive consumer demand for each strategy available to the
publisher. We start with the demand for the sampling strategy and follow this
by characterizing demands for the two boundary strategies, paid-only and free
content, respectively. Note that, if free samples have been offered, at this stage
consumers have already observed the sample qualities of the free articles and
updated their prior believes about the journalistic quality.
3.1 Sampling Strategy
When the publisher employs a sampling strategy, consumers decide whether
or not to subscribe after observing qualities v1, . . . , vn (where 0 < n < N). A
consumer will subscribe to the news website if and only if her indirect utility
from a digital subscription exceeds her indirect utility from consuming only the
free content. Therefore, if (N − n)θE[V |v1, . . . , vn] − p ≥ 0, the consumer will
subscribe. This condition has the interpretation that the expected utility from
the content behind the paywall must exceed the subscription price. Using (2)
and (3) and recalling that θ follows a uniform distribution on [0, 1], consumer
demand for paid content can be expressed as
D(p, n) = Pr
{
θ ≥ p
(N − n)E[V |v1, . . . , vn]
}
= max
{
0, 1− 2(α + n− 1)
(N − n)(α + n)
p
v˜0(n)
}
. (4)
15Implications of ad-loving and ad-avoiding behavior are, for instance, analyzed in Gabs-
zewicz et al. (2005).
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Table 1: Summary of strategies.
Decision variables
Available strategies Free samples Price Subscriptions
Sampling strategy 0 < n < N p(n) DE(p(n), n)
Paid-only strategy n = 0 p(0) D(p(0), 0)
Free content strategy n = N n.a. 0
Notes: DE(p(n), n) denotes the (expected) subscription demand, and p(n) is
the publisher optimal price given its sampling decision.
Clearly, demand decreases with price p. If p = 0, all consumer subscribe and
if p exceeds a specified threshold level, there is no subscription demand. De-
mand for the paid content has the desirable property that it is increasing in the
consumers’ posterior expectations about content quality.
3.2 Paid-Only Strategy
When the publisher employs the paid-only strategy (n = 0), the prior and the
posterior expectations about V¯ coincide (and hence v˜0 = v¯0) as there is no learn-
ing through sampling. Therefore, setting n = 0 in (4), the consumer demand for
paid content is given by
D(p, 0) = max
{
0, 1− 2(α− 1)
αN
p
v¯0
}
.
3.3 Free Content Strategy
When the publisher employs a free content strategy (n = N), consumers never
subscribe as they get access to the content for free. Thus, there is a zero sub-
scription demand.
3.4 Summing Up
Table 1 summarizes the strategies available to the publisher. If the publisher
offers free samples, she employs a sampling strategy; if she does not offer free
samples, she uses a paid-only strategy; and if she offers the content for free,
she employs a free content strategy. The publisher’s pricing decision depends
on its sampling decision, as captured by the notation p(n). The next section
analyzes optimal behavior of the publisher and gives conditions under which
each strategy will be optimal.
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4 Analysis
We start with analyzing the expected subscription demand under a sampling
strategy and follow with the analysis of the publisher’s decisions considering
both digital subscriptions and advertising revenues from free and paid content.
4.1 Subscription Demand
Consumer demand for paid content in (4) is based on prior beliefs, taking the
quality of the sample articles into account. However, when the publisher makes
decisions about the price and the number of sample articles, she has to base
them on expected demand as consumers have not yet evaluated sample qual-
ities and updated their beliefs. Taking expectation of the consumer demand
produces the (expected) subscription demand
DE(p, n) = max
{
0, 1− 2(α+ n− 1)
(N − n)(α + n)
p
E [v˜0(n)]
}
. (5)
Offering a larger number of free samples has two effects on expected sub-
scription demand. Following Bawa and Shoemaker (2004), we label the two
effects, respectively, the “cannibalization effect” and the (expected) “expansion
effect.” To capture these effects, we define
c(n) ≡ 2(α + n− 1)
(N − n)(α + n) and e(n) ≡
1
E [v˜0(n)]
.
This allows us to express the subscription demand in (5) more compactly as
DE(p, n) = max {0, 1− c(n)e(n)p}. The cannibalization effect of sampling, de-
fined by c′(n), is always positive.16 It captures the reduction of the expected
subscription demand that results from offering more free articles. Intuitively,
an increase in the number of free samples decreases the value a consumer ob-
tains from the content behind the paywall. The expansion effect is defined by
e′(n). It captures consumers’ learning about the highest quality V¯ through sam-
pling.
The expansion effect plays a role if and only if offering free samples results
in an upward revision of the prior on the lower bound on the highest quality
v¯0. Whether or not sampling leads to such a revision depends on the relative
16Using the definition of c(n) in equation (5), we find that
c′(n) =
2
[
N + n2 + 2n(α− 1) + α(α − 1)]
(N − n)2(α+ n)2 ,
which is positive as α > 1 by assumption.
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Figure 1: Different prior expectations about V¯ (the figure uses the normalization
V¯ ≡ 1). Actual qualities are distributed uniformly on [0, V¯ ].
magnitudes of v¯0 and V¯ . We distinguish the two cases of “high quality ex-
pectations” (v¯0 ≥ V¯ ) and “low quality expectations” (v¯0 < V¯ ). In the case of
high quality expectations, there is no revision in the lower bound for the high-
est quality. That is, v˜0(n) = v¯0 irrespective of how many articles are sampled
for free (for a graphical illustration, see Figure 1, Panel a). Hence, offering free
samples does not have an expansion effect and therefore e′(n) = 0. However,
sampling may have a demand-enhancing effect in the low-quality expectations
case. That happens when one of the sampled qualities exceeds v¯0 (this possibil-
ity is illustrated in Figure 1, Panel b). Hence, in this case e′(n) ≤ 0 (with strict
inequality if v˜0(n) > v¯0). Clearly, the expansion effect is more likely to kick in
when consumers have low expectations about v¯0 relative to V¯ .17 This discussion
leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1. If the publisher employs a sampling strategy, then increasing the number of
free samples has two effects on subscription demand; a “cannibalization effect” which
reduces the subscription demand as c′(n) > 0, and an “expansion effect” which may
increase the subscription demand as e′(n) ≤ 0.
The challenge in calculating the expansion effect e′(n) analytically is to de-
rive an expression for e(n) = E [1/v˜0(n)] in (5), thereby taking into account the
consumers’ preferences and their Bayesian updating. The following proposi-
tion presents the subscription demands along with analytical expressions for
e(n) arising in the two cases; the subscripts H and L refer, respectively, to high
and low quality expectations.
17The restriction v¯0 < V¯ does not imply that the prior expectation is smaller than V¯ : Whether
or not this happens to be the case depends on the prior of the shape parameter α.
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Proposition 1. When the publisher offers a random content sample that consists of
n ≥ 1 articles with qualities V1, . . . , Vn and subscription at a price of p, then
(a) if v¯0 ≥ V¯ (high quality expectations), the subscription demand is given by
DEH(p, n) = max
{
0, 1− c(n)p
v¯0
}
.
(b) if v¯0 < V¯ (low quality expectations), the subscription demand for n = 1 is given
by
DEL(p, 1) = max
{
0, 1− c(1)
[
1 + ln
(
V¯ /v¯0
)]
p
V¯
}
,
and for n > 1 it is given by
DEL(p, n) = max
{
0, 1− c(n)
(
nV¯ n−1 − v¯n−10
)
p
(n− 1)V¯ n
}
.
This proposition allows us to derive the expansion effect analytically. For the
case of high quality expectations, we have that e′(n) = 0 and hence sampling
has only a cannibalization effect. Therefore, subscription demand DEH(p, n) is
unambiguously decreasing in the sample size n. For the case of low quality
expectations, Proposition 1 implies that the expansion effect is strictly negative
for n > 1. More precisely, we have
Corollary 1. For n > 1 and when v¯0 ≤ V¯ , the expansion effect is negative, that is,
e′(n) < 0.
Proposition 1 also allows us to investigate the tension between the canni-
balization effect and the expansion effect on more detail. To this end, it is use-
ful to define the elasticities of the slope components c(n) and e(n) as c(n) ≡
c′(n)n/c(n) and e(n) ≡ −e′(n)n/e(n), respectively. The next result shows that
the two elasticities determine the effect of sampling on subscription demand.
Corollary 2. For n > 1 and v¯0 ≤ V¯ , sampling increases subscription demand if and
only if c(n) < e(n) and decreases the subscription demand if and only if c(n) > e(n).
The result shows that sampling is demand-enhancing if the cannibalization
is relatively small when compared to the expansion effect. For instance, a large
expansion effect can be expected when consumers have a low prior expectation
about V¯ . Clearly, whether or not sampling is demand-enhancing depends on
all other model parameters as well. Figure 2 illustrates the two cases: Panel (a)
demonstrates a case where the subscription demand is increasing in n while
Panel (b) demonstrates one where it is decreasing in n.
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Figure 2: Sampling effects for different values of v¯0 on subscription demand
(v¯0 = 0.5 in Panel a; and v¯0 = 0.95 in Panel b), when α = 25, V¯ = 1, N = 100,
and p = 20.
We conclude this section by noting the comparative statics effects of the con-
sumers’ prior parameters. From Proposition 1, subscription demand is increas-
ing in expected quality measured by v¯0 and decreasing in the degree of prior
uncertainty about v¯0 measured by α. Therefore, subscription demand has the in-
tuitive property that it is increasing in the consumers’ prior expectations about
content quality. The effect of α can be grasped intuitively by observing that a
higher α reduces the posterior expectations (for a given v¯0) and therefore sub-
scription demand.
4.2 Optimal Decisions
The publisher makes two decisions: Howmany articles n to sample for free and
the subscription price p. For expositional convenience, we assume that the pub-
lisher makes the sampling decision before the pricing decision.18 The optimal
strategy of the publisher then follows from comparing the profit levels that arise
from the three strategies. We start with analyzing the sampling strategy.
Sampling Strategy. Indexing the profit function with S for “sampling,” the
publisher’s (expected) profits are given by
πS(p, n) = (p+ ap)D
E(p, n) + afn. (6)
The profits are the sum of subscription revenues and direct advertising rev-
enues generated from sampling. Subscription revenues stem from two sources:
18The solution to the problem is the same when n and p are chosen simultaneously as the
decisions do not have external effects.
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pDE(p, n) from subscription fees and apDE(p, n) from including ads in the paid
version. The advertising revenues from sampling are given by afn.
To study optimal pricing given a sampling decision, we derive the first-order
condition of the profit function with respect to p. This yields
∂πS
∂p
(p, n) = DE(p, n) + (p+ ap)
∂DE
∂p
(p, n) = 0.
From the first-order condition we find the optimal (best-response) price
p(n) =
1
2
(
1
c(n)e(n)
− ap
)
. (7)
Inspection of the best-response function shows that the publisher should set
a lower subscription price when the per-subscriber ad revenues ap are higher.
Moreover, the best-response function reveals that ad revenues from sampling
do not affect the choice of the optimal price, a consequence of advertising rev-
enues being fixed for a given n. However, it should be clear that af is an im-
portant determinant of the profit level. Our next results shows how the best-
response price varies with the number of free samples.
Proposition 2. (a) If v¯0 ≥ V¯ , the optimal price decreases with n. (b) If v¯0 ≤ V¯ and
sampling is demand-reducing, the optimal subscription price decreases with n, and (c)
if sampling is demand-enhancing, the optimal subscription price increases with n.
Whether sampling leads to a lower or a higher subscription price depends
on the relativemagnitudes of the cannibalization effect and the expansion effect.
For high expectations, optimal subscription prices are lower when the number
of free samples is larger. This reflects the reduction of the consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for the content behind the paywall. For low expectations, the pub-
lisher can mitigate the profit impact from the reduction in subscription demand
that stems from demand-reducing sampling by lowering its price. In contrast,
if sampling is demand-enhancing, it is optimal for the publisher to increase its
price when she offers more free samples.
The next step is to study the optimal sampling decision. In order to find
the optimal sample size, we substitute p(n) back into the profit function to ob-
tain the reduced-form profit function πS(n) and derive its first-order condition
with respect to n. Suppressing the arguments of the demand function for con-
venience, the first-order condition is
dπS(n)
dn
= p′(n)DE + (p(n) + ap)
(
∂DE
∂p
p′(n) +
∂DE
∂n
)
+ af = 0. (8)
Given the analytical complexity of the profit function, we have to rely on nu-
merical methods to determine the optimal sampling and pricing decision. This
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approach involves four steps:19 First, we determine the solution(s) to the first-
order condition given in (8). Second, we compute a corresponding subscription
price for each solution using the best-response function in (7). Third, we check
for each candidate decision (p˜, n˜) whether it satisfies the sufficient conditions
for a relative profit maximum. Fourth, and last, we determine the optimal inte-
ger solution n∗: This solution can be determined by rounding admissible values
of n˜ down and up, calculating the corresponding prices, and comparing the two
profit levels. The optimal pricing and sampling decision employing a sampling
strategy then is the one that delivers the highest profits. For brevity, we denote
this profit level by π(n∗).
Paid-Only Strategy. When employing a paid-only strategy, the publisher’s
profits are obtained by maximizing (p + ap)D(p, 0) with respect to p. As a re-
sults, the publisher’s optimized profits can be expressed as
π(0) =
(2(α− 1)ap + αNv¯0)2
8α(α− 1)Nv¯0 .
Free Content Strategy. When employing a free content strategy, profits are sim-
ply given by the revenues from online advertising. Hence, the profit level is
given by π(N) = afN .
Optimal Strategy. The publisher’s overall optimal sampling decision is the one
that yields the highest profit among the three different strategies. It is char-
acterized by nˆ ∈ {0, n∗, N} where π(nˆ) > π(n) for all n = nˆ in {0, n∗, N}. The
corresponding optimal subscription price then is pˆ = p(nˆ). Thus, the publisher’s
optimal pricing and sampling strategy can compactly be written as (pˆ, nˆ).
5 Results
This section presents the optimal strategy of the publisher for the two cases of
high and low quality expectations. In addition, we study how changes in the
market environment affect the optimal pricing and sampling decisions.
5.1 High Quality Expectations
When consumers have high quality expectations, it turns out that it is never
optimal for the publisher to employ a sampling strategy. As a consequence, the
publisher will always employ one of its two boundary strategies. Whether a
paid-only or a free content strategy yields higher profits depends on the com-
parison of the respective profit levels π(0) and π(N). Optimally, the publisher
19The full details of the numerical analysis are available from the authors upon request.
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will employ a paid-only strategy if and only if π(0) > π(N) and a free content
strategy otherwise. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 3. When v¯0 ≥ V¯ , the publisher never employs a sampling strategy. The
publisher uses a paid-only strategy if af <
(αNv¯0+2(α−1)ap)2
8α(α−1)N2 v¯0 and a free content strategy
if the inequality is reversed.
There are several remarks in order. First, the publisher should implement a
paid-only strategy when the price of online ad impressions af is low. Therefore,
a sufficiently large increase in af induces a change from a paid-only strategy to a
free content-strategy. It also shows that the publisher is more inclined to adopt
a subscription strategy if ap is high. Second, the larger the platform size N ,
the less likely it is that the publisher adopts a subscription strategy for a given
structure of advertising revenues. Third, the effects of both prior parameters α
and v¯0 on the threshold level are ambiguous. The threshold is increasing in v¯0
and decreasing in α for sufficiently high prior expectations. Intuitively, higher
prior expectations go along with a higher subscription price, thereby increasing
the profit of a paid-only strategy.
5.2 Low Quality Expectations
When consumers have low quality expectations, the sampling strategy may
yield the highest profits. As a consequence, offering free samples may be opti-
mal.
Proposition 4. When v¯0 < V¯ , the publisher may employ a sampling strategy. In some
market environments, the sampling strategy leads to higher profits than the paid-only
strategy or the free content strategy.
This result is illustrated in Figures 3 through 5 which portrays the numerical
solutions of our model for various market environments, each resulting from a
particular parameter constellation. For expositional convenience, we normalize
the highest quality offered V¯ ≡ 1 and the per-subscriber advertising revenues
ap ≡ 1.20
Figure 3 shows that the publisher should offer free content samples in some
market environments. More specifically, Panel (a) plots the optimal sampling
strategy nˆ as a function of v¯0 and reveals that sampling is indeed optimal when
consumers have low quality expectations. In plotting nˆ, we treat all model pa-
rameters other than v¯0 as fixed. Figure 4 and Figure 5 plot, respectively, the
corresponding optimal prices pˆ and the profit levels π(nˆ).
20Qualitatively, the choice of specific parameter values do not affect the figures.
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(3a) N = 30 and α = 5
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(3b) N = 30 and α = 25
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(3c) N = 100 and α = 5
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(3d) N = 100 and α = 25
Figure 3: Optimal number of free samples nˆ for low quality expectations.
Our graphical analysis illustrates that the optimal price pˆ is decreasing in
the number of free samples nˆ. This is perhaps best seen by observing that a
higher value of v¯0 leads to a lower nˆ (Figure 3) and a higher price pˆ (Figure 4).
The inverse relationship between the optimal number of free samples and the
subscription price is implied by Proposition 2 as sampling is demand-reducing
in most market environments for our parametrization. Nevertheless, sacrificing
subscription demand by offering samples leads to higher profits (Figure 5).
Our graphical analysis allows us to study the effects of changes in themarket
environment on optimal sampling, pricing and profits. Specifically, alterations
in the market environment may be brought about by changes in consumers’
expectations (captured by changes in v¯0 and α) or by changes in the publisher’s
exogenous parameters (captured by af andN). Here a higher value of a af leads
to an increase in the ratio of ad revenues af/ap, as ap is fixed in our graphical
analysis. We begin with the effects on optimal sampling.
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(4d) N = 100 and α = 25
Figure 4: Optimal prices pˆ for low quality expectations.
Finding 1. The number of optimal samples nˆ is higher (i) the lower consumers’ ex-
pected quality measured by v¯0, (ii) the lower consumers’ prior uncertainty about v¯0
measured by α, (iii) the higher advertising revenue for online impressions af , and (iv)
the more articles N the publisher produces.
These effects can all be seen graphically in Figure 3: The effect of v¯0 on nˆ in
each panel, the effect of α by comparing the panels across columns, the effect
of af within each panel, and the effect of N by comparing panels across rows.
Publisher should offer fewer articles for free when consumers have higher prior
expectations about content quality (either because of a high v¯0 or a low α). In-
tuitively, higher prior expectations increase the demand-reducing effect of sam-
pling and thereby reduce the publisher’s incentives to offer free samples. Once
prior expectations are high enough, it is no longer optimal for the publisher to
employ the sampling strategy. Instead, it is optimal for the publisher to employ
a paid-only strategy and refrain from sampling. A third comparative statics
effect shows that the publisher should offer more free samples when online
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(5d) N = 100 and α = 25
Figure 5: Optimized profits π(nˆ) for low quality expectations.
advertising revenues increase. When the marginal revenue of sampling af is
higher, the publisher has an incentive to increase the number of free samples,
thereby increasing its marginal cost because of demand-reducing sampling, up
to the point where the equality between marginal cost and revenue is restored.
The last comparative statics result is that the publisher should offer more free
content samples when she produces more content (as measured by N), but that
the proportion sampled decreases. The intuition is that a larger content size
leads to a lower demand-reducing effect of sampling, which in turn increases
the publisher’s incentive to offer free samples.
An immediate implication of Finding 1 is how alterations in the market en-
vironment affect the optimal proportion to sample (nˆ/N).
Finding 2. The optimal sample portion nˆ/N is higher (i) the lower consumers’ ex-
pected quality v¯0, (ii) the lower consumers’ prior uncertainty measured by α, (iii) the
higher advertising revenue for online impressions af , and (iv) the fewer articles N the
publisher produces.
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Table 2: Summary of comparative statics effects.
Sampling Pricing
Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect
dnˆ
dv¯0
< 0
∂p
∂v¯0
= − c(∂e/∂v¯0)
2(ce)2
> 0
∂p
∂n
dnˆ
v¯0
> 0
dpˆ
v¯0
> 0
dnˆ
dα
> 0
∂p
∂α
= −e(∂c/∂α)
2(ce)2
< 0
∂p
∂n
dnˆ
α
< 0
dpˆ
α
< 0
dnˆ
daf
> 0
∂p
∂af
= 0
∂p
∂n
dnˆ
af
< 0
dpˆ
af
< 0
dnˆ
dN
> 0
∂p
∂N
= −e(∂c/∂N)
2(ce)2
> 0
∂p
∂n
dnˆ
N
< 0
dpˆ
N
> 0
Notes: Recall that ∂p/∂n has a negative sign.
Next, we consider the effects of changes in the market environment on opti-
mal pricing.
Finding 3. The optimal price pˆ is higher (i) the higher consumers’ expected quality v¯0,
(ii) the higher consumers’ prior uncertainty measured by α, (iii) the lower advertising
revenue for online impressions af , and (iv) the more articles N the publisher produces.
The comparative statics effects can be best understood by decomposing the
total price effect into a “sampling-mediated effect” and a “direct effect.” To
make this explicit, we let the generic variable x stand for one of the model pa-
rameters. Writing the price as p = p(n(x), x), the price change induced by vary-
ing x is given by dp/dx = (∂p/∂n)(dn/dx) + ∂p/∂x, where the first term on the
right-hand side is the sampling-mediated effect and the second term the direct
effect. The sign of the sampling-mediated effect is determined by the slope of
the best-response function (derived from Eq. (7) above) and the sign of dn/dx
(from Finding 1). The sign of the direct effect is obtained from differentiating
the best-response function with respect to the parameter x of interest. Table 2
summarizes the comparative statics effects for various model parameters.
Table 2 shows that the direct effect of v¯0 on the price is positive. Higher
quality expectations reinforce the positive sampling-mediated effect and thus
lead to a higher optimal price. Intuitively, the direct effect is positive because
higher quality expectations reduce the expansion effect (see Table 2). Second,
the direct effect of α on the price is negative, which exacerbates the negative
indirect effect, thereby leading to a lower optimal price. The explanation is that
the indirect effect is negative because lower uncertainty about quality increases
the cannibalization effect. Third, a higher af has no direct effect on the price.
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Hence, the optimal price is lower because the sampling-mediated effect is neg-
ative. Fourth, the direct effect of N on price is positive as it reduces the can-
nibalization effect. The positive direct effect dominates, however, the negative
sampling-mediated effect, which in turn leads to a higher optimal price.
Finally, we summarize the profit impact of changes in the market environ-
ment. With the previous results in mind, the effects should be intuitive.
Finding 4. Optimal profits π(nˆ) are higher (i) the higher consumers’ expected quality
v¯0, (ii) the higher consumers’ prior uncertainty measured by α, (iii) the higher adver-
tising revenue for online impressions af , and (iv) the more articles N the publisher
produces.
6 Conclusions
This paper has examined the two interrelated questions of many articles a pub-
lisher of newswebsites should offer for free and howmuch the publisher should
charge for the content behind the paywall. The key feature of this model is
that publishers offer representative free content samples to disclose journalistic
quality to consumers and thereby generate online advertising revenues. Con-
sumers choose the specific sample articles themselves and learn from them in
a Bayesian fashion. Based on posterior quality expectations, consumers make
their subscription decisions.
We derived the following three principle results. First, we show how sub-
scription demand depends on consumers’ posterior expectations about content
quality. Distinguishing the cases of high and low quality expectations, we show
that offering free samples is always demand-reducing when consumers have
high quality expectations while that it may be demand-increasing when con-
sumers have low quality expectations. Second, we show that the subscription
price and the number of free samples are negatively related when consumers
have high quality expectations and that they may be positively related when
consumers have low quality expectations. Third, we show that the publisher
should never employ a sampling strategy when consumers have high quality
expectations. Whether the publisher employs a paid-only strategy or a free con-
tent strategy depends on the advertising revenues. We find that the firm should
employ a free content strategy when online advertising revenues from the sam-
ples are high and a paid-only strategy when online advertising revenues from
the samples are low. When consumers have low quality expectations, employ-
ing a sampling strategy may be optimal for the publisher. In our numerical
study we find that the publisher should offer more free samples when con-
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sumers have lower quality expectations and when online advertising revenues
are higher.
Our predictions are consistent with casual observations from the media in-
dustry. Once online advertising rates are high enough, our model predicts that
the publisher should offer its entire content for free. This might explain why the
New York Times abandoned its online subscription program, TimesSelect, in 2007
when online advertising revenues were soaring. Likewise, our model predicts
that the publisher should introduce digital subscriptions and offer a limited
number of free samples when online advertising revenues decrease. This might
be an explanation of why the New York Times re-introduced digital subscriptions
in 2011.
The proposed model can also be applied in other contexts as well. Opti-
mal sampling of paid content and advertising plays a role in distributing apps
such as Angry Birds or Talking Tom Cat for Apple devices. A consumer can ei-
ther download a free trial version peppered with advertisements or purchase
the full version of these games. More broadly, our model also seems relevant
for any experience good, including books, music and movies.
Our analysis contributes to a scant literature on sampling of information
goods and suggests several avenues for future research. First, it would be nat-
ural to allow for competing news websites. Second, it would interesting to
endogenize the outcome of the online advertising market. Third, it would be
desirable to generalize our model to a dynamic, multi-period model that in-
cludes multiple updatings of consumers’ product quality valuations. We hope
this paper encourages work in these and related directions.
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Appendix
A.1 Sampling From a Uniform Distribution
The Pareto Distribution. A random variable X has a Pareto distribution with parame-
ters w0 and α (w0 > 0 and α > 0) if X has a density
f(x|w0, α) =
{
αwα0
xα+1 for x > w0
0 otherwise.
For α > 1 the expectation ofX exists and it is given by
E(X) =
αw0
α− 1 .
Theorem (DeGroot, 1970).21 Suppose that X1, . . . ,Xn is a random sample from a uniform
distribution of the interval (0,W ), where the value of W is unknown. Suppose also that the
prior distribution of W is a Pareto distribution with parameters w0 and α such that w0 > 0
and α > 0. Then the posterior distribution of W when Xi = xi (i = 1, . . . , n) is a Pareto
distribution with parameters w′0 and α+ n, where
w′0 = max{w0, x1, . . . , xn}.
Proof. For w > w0, the prior density function ξ ofW has the following form:22
ξ(w) ∝ 1
wα+1
.
Furthermore, ξ(w) = 0 for w ≤ w0. The likelihood function fn(x1, . . . , xn|w) of Xi = xi
(i = 1, . . . , n), whenW = w (w > 0) is given by:23
fn(x1, . . . , xn|w) = f(x1|w) · · · f(xn|w) =
{
1
wn for max{x1, . . . , xn} < w
0 otherwise.
It follows from these relations that the posterior p.d.f. ξ(w|x1, . . . , xn) will be positive
only for values w such that w > w0 and w > max{x1, . . . , xn}. Therefore, ξ(w|·) > 0
only if w > w′0. For w > w
′
0, it follows from Bayes’ theorem that
ξ(w|x1, . . . , xn) ∝ fn(x1, . . . , xn|w)ξ(w) = 1
wα+n+1
(the marginal joint probability density function fn(x1, . . . , xn) of X1, . . . ,Xn is a nor-
malizing constant).
21Theorem 1, p. 172.
22The glyph “∝” means “proportional to.”
23GivenW = w, the randomvariablesX1, . . . , Xn are independent and identically distributed
and the common probability density function of each of the random variables is f(xi|w).
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A.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) For given n, expected demand can be derived from (4):
DEH(p, n) ≡ E [DH(p, n)] = max
{
0, 1− c(n)E
[
1
v˜′0(n)
]
p
}
. (A.1)
As v¯0 ≥ V¯ , v˜0(n) = max{v¯0, V1, . . . , Vn} is equal to v¯0 with probability 1. Thus, the
expected expansion effect is given by
E[e(n)] = E
[
1
v˜0(n)
]
=
1
v¯0
,
and the expected demand follows as stated in the proposition. (b) For given n, expected
demand DEL(p, n) can be derived similarly as in (A.1). In the present case, we need to
calculate the expected expansion effect under the assumption that v¯0 < V¯ . To this end,
we begin by deriving the distribution of v˜0(n) = max{v¯0, V1, . . . , Vn}. Before doing so,
we state a preliminary fact: LetM = max{V1, . . . , Vn}. Then, the distribution function
ofM is given by:
FM (t) ≡ Pr{max{V1, . . . , Vn} ≤ t}
= Pr {{V1 ≤ t} ∩ . . . ∩ {Vn ≤ t}}
=
n∏
i=1
Pr {Vi ≤ t} =
(
t
V¯
)n
. (A.2)
As an immediate implication, the density function ofM is given by
fM (t) =
ntn−1
V¯ n
. (A.3)
Next we derive the density function of v˜0(n). By definition, v˜0(n) cannot be smaller
than v¯0. Therefore, v˜0(n) = v¯0 if and only if max{V1, . . . , Vn} ≤ v¯0. The probability of
this event follows from (A.2) and it is given by
FM (v¯0) =
( v¯0
V¯
)n
.
For v˜0(n) > v¯0, let F˜ (·) denote the truncated distribution function of v˜0(n). After remov-
ing the lower part of the distribution, we have F˜ (t) = FM (t) − FM (v¯0) for t ∈ [v¯0, V¯ ].
This implies f˜(t) = fM (t) for t ∈ [v¯0, V¯ ], and hence
f˜(t) =
ntn−1
V¯ n
, if v¯0 ≤ t ≤ V¯
by (A.3). The distribution of v˜0(n) has a mixed structure with
Pr {v˜0(n) = v¯0} =
( v¯0
V¯
)n
(A.4)
and density
f˜(t) =
ntn−1
V¯ n
, if v¯0 ≤ t ≤ V¯ . (A.5)
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Next, we derive the distribution of 1/v˜0(n). Define G(t) as the cumulative distribu-
tion function function of 1/v˜0(n). Note that G(t) = 1 − F˜ (1/t), which in turn implies
g(t) =
(
1/t2
)
f˜ (1/t). From (A.5),
g(t) =
n
V¯ ntn+1
.
Furthermore, observing that Pr {1/v˜0(n) = 1/v¯0} = Pr {v˜0(n) = v¯0} by definition, (A.4)
implies thatPr {1/v˜0(n) = 1/v¯0} =
(
v¯0/V¯
)n. Thus, the randomvariable 1/v˜0(n) follows
a mixed distribution with density
g(t) =
n
V¯ ntn+1
, for
1
V¯
≤ t ≤ 1
v¯0
and takes value 1/v¯0 with probability
(
v¯0/V¯
)n.
Thus we finally obtain
E
[
1
v˜0(n)
]
=
1
v¯0
( v¯0
V¯
)n
+
∫ 1/v¯0
1/V¯
tfˆ(t)dt
=
⎧⎨
⎩
1+ln(V¯ /v¯0)
V¯
, for n = 1
nV¯ n−1−v¯n−10
(n−1)V¯ n , for n > 1,
and the expecteddemand follows as stated in the proposition. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. If n > 1,
e′(n) = −
V¯ n−1 − v¯n−10
(
1 + ln
(
V¯ /v¯0
)n−1)
(n− 1)2V¯ n . (A.6)
Expanding the right-hand side of (A.6) by 1/v¯n−10 and letting r =
(
V¯ /v¯0
)n−1, the nu-
merator can be written as r − (1 + ln r). Clearly, the denominator is positive. Using a
Taylor expansion around r = 1 and noting that r > 1 by the hypothesis, we have that
r − 1 > ln r, which in turn implies that the numerator is positive as well. Hence, the
expected expansion effect is negative. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2. Differentiating (5) with respect to the n yields
∂DEL(p, n)
∂n
=− (c′(n)e(n) + c(n)e′(n)) p
=− c(n)e(n)(c(n)− e(n))p
n
,
where the second equality follows from using the definition of the two elasticities.
Lemma 1 implies that c(n) > 0. From from Corollary 1, we know that e′(n) < 0
and hence that e(n) > 0. Thus, ∂DEL(p, n)/∂n < 0 if and only if c(n) < e(n). This
completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Differentiating the best-response function given in (7) with respect
to n and using the definitions of c(n) and e(n), the slope of p(n) is given by
p′(n) =
e(n)− c(n)
2nc(n)e(n)
.
With high quality expectations e(n) = 0 by Lemma 1. As c′(n) > 0, we thus have
that p′(n) < 0. With low quality expectations, the sign of p′(n) depends on the sign of
c(n)− e(n): Using Corollary 2, p′(n) > 0 if and only if sampling is demand-enhancing
and p′(n) < 0 if and only if sampling is demand-reducing. This establishes the claim.
Proof of Proposition 3. The profit function πS(p, n) as given in (6) has a relative maximum
at (p˜, n˜) if ∂2πS(p˜, n˜)/∂p2 < 0, ∂2πS(p˜, n˜)/∂n2 < 0, and the determinant of the Hessian
matrix of πS(p, n), evaluated at the critical point (p˜, n˜), is positive.24 However, after
tedious but straightforward calculations, it turns out that the determinant is negative
for all parameter constellations.25 Therefore, the profit function πS(p, n) has a saddle
point at (p˜, n˜), which in turn implies that there is no interior maximum.
All that remains to do is to compare the profits from the two boundary strategies.
The publisher should adopt a subscription strategy if and only if π(0) > π(N) or, equiv-
alently, if and only if
af <
(αNv¯0 + 2(α− 1)ap)2
8α(α − 1)N2v¯0 .
This completes the proof.
24See, for instance, Chiang (1984, p. 317).
25The detailed proof is available from the authors upon request.
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